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1. Aesthetics in mathematics 
Mathematicians often appreciate the beauty and elegance of particular theorems, proofs, and 
definitions, attaching importance not only to the truth but also to the aesthetic merit of their 
work. As Henri Poincaré (1930: 59) put it, mathematical beauty is a ‘real aesthetic feeling that 
all true mathematicians recognise’. Others went further, regarding mathematical beauty as a 
key motivation driving the formulation of mathematical proofs and even as a criterion for 
choosing one proof over another. As Hermann Weyl famously and provocatively declared, 
‘My work always tried to unite the true with the beautiful, but when I had to choose one or 
the other, I usually chose the beautiful’ (cited in Chandrasekhar 1987: 52).  
Talk of the beauty of mathematical theorems, proofs, and definitions may thus be 
commonplace. And yet the tendency among mathematicians to judge mathematical work 
according to aesthetic standards raises a number of difficult questions: 
 
(1) What is mathematical beauty? What, if anything, distinguishes it from other kinds 
of beauty? Is it a feature of abstract objects or grounded in sensible properties? Is it 
a genuine aesthetic category or can it be reduced to non-aesthetic, possibly 
epistemic, criteria?  
(2) What is the status of aesthetic judgments in mathematics? Are they objective 
judgments grounded, for instance, in the mathematician’s cognition of such 
properties as symmetry or simplicity? Do they rely on subjective responses 
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particular to individual mathematicians? Or are they, perhaps, grounded in other 
kinds of mental processes? 
(3) Can aesthetic considerations play any legitimate role in mathematical or scientific 
theorising? Does the beauty of a proof stand in any non-contingent relation to its 
truth? And can any connection be drawn between the elegance of a mathematical 
formalism – the differential forms employed to express Maxwell’s equations or the 
group theory used in quantum mechanics – and the truth of the scientific theory 
that contains the formalism? 
(4) Does the phenomenon of aesthetics in mathematics reveal any important 
analogies between mathematical and artistic practice? In particular, what is the 
role of imagination in mathematics, and how does it compare to the role of 
imagination in the arts?  
 
In the recent philosophical literature one finds only a handful of attempts to develop 
sustained answers to these questions. Thus, a number of authors in aesthetics and the 
philosophy of mathematics have tried to shed light on mathematical beauty by highlighting its 
relation to such factors as order, harmony, unity, symmetry and simplicity (see Osborne 1984, 
Engler 1990 and, more recently, Inglis and Aberdein 2014 whose careful analysis sheds doubt 
on the connection between beauty and simplicity). Others have argued that judgments about 
the beauty of mathematics are related to the understanding or enlightenment that the 
mathematics affords (see Rota 1997 and Cellucci 2015; cf. also Hardy’s 1940 classic 
‘mathematician’s apology’). Yet others have argued along Kantian lines that aesthetic 
judgments in mathematics are grounded in the spontaneous reasoning processes that lead to 
mathematical cognition (Breitenbach 2015; cf. Wenzel’s 2001 more sceptical Kantian 
account). But there have also been critical voices, questioning whether explicit judgments 
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about the beauty or elegance of mathematics have genuine aesthetic status and suggesting 
instead that they are only ‘quasi-aesthetic’ claims (see, in particular, Harré 1958, Zangwill 
2001, and Todd 2008).1 
Some philosophers of mathematics and theoreticians in the field of mathematics 
education have furthermore stressed the need to take seriously the aesthetic dimension of 
mathematical practices. Some have argued that, by analogy with art, aesthetic judgments 
play a major role in the development of mathematics research, for example, by determining 
which results to include in ongoing research programmes or research monographs 
(Tymoczko 1993). Others have moreover spoken of a ‘generative aesthetic’, which ‘operates 
in the actual process of inquiry, in the discovery and invention of solutions’ (Sinclair 2004: 
270; see also McAllister 2005, Sinclair 2011, and Montano 2014 who, building on 
McAllister’s work, provides the most extensive study to date of the role of aesthetics in 
shaping mathematical knowledge). Finally, related work, more specifically focussed on set 
theory, suggests that aesthetic value bears on, and may even serve as evidence for, the truth of 
mathematical statements (see Kennedy and Väänänen 2015).  
While there is a small literature on the theme of this special issue, it has received much 
less attention than other topics in aesthetics or the philosophy of mathematics. We believe 
that this is due in part to the fact that the two philosophical sub-disciplines of aesthetics and 
the philosophy of mathematics are often perceived to lie at opposite ends of the philosophical 
spectrum and that interaction between philosophers specialising in these apparently distant 
fields has been sparse. Topics in aesthetics such as the nature of art, beauty and aesthetic 
experience simply seem to have little connection with such problems in philosophy of 
mathematics as the logical structure of formal arguments or the ontological status of abstract 
objects. And yet we believe that the phenomenon of aesthetics in mathematics and the 
																																																						
1 Although the focus in these critical accounts is primarily on the aesthetics of science, the 
arguments can easily be extended to the aesthetics of mathematics. 
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pervasive appeal of aesthetic criteria to mathematicians raise questions that are of importance 
to core concerns in both areas, for example, about the relation of aesthetic judgment to 
cognition and about the nature of mathematical reasoning. We believe, moreover, that these 
questions are best answered by taking into account the insights and concerns of aestheticians 
as well as philosophers of mathematics. A real dialogue between specialists in the two fields 
provides the right context for a rigorous analysis of aesthetics in mathematics. 
It was this conviction that motivated us to organise an international conference on the 
topic that brought together aestheticians, philosophers of mathematics and mathematicians at 
the University of East Anglia in December 2014. The papers included in this special issue are 
a selection from the many original and illuminating contributions that were presented at the 
conference and that, in a range of different ways, shed light on the different questions that 
arise for the aesthetics of mathematics.  
 
2. The papers 
Irina Starikova tackles question (1) in her paper ‘Aesthetic Preferences in Mathematics: A 
Case Study’. She asks whether abstract mathematical objects can be genuinely beautiful and, 
if so, what features make them beautiful. Is their beauty solely a matter of their diagrammatic 
visualisation? Or does it have to do with their abstract mathematical properties? Starikova 
develops her answer by considering an illustrative example, the Petersen graph, a highly 
symmetric object whose properties have been extensively studied. It is possible to represent 
the Petersen graph set-theoretically as a set of vertices plus a set of edges connecting some of 
the vertices. This set-theoretical representation can in turn be rendered diagrammatically in a 
number of different ways. One of these diagrammatic renderings is often singled out by 
graph-theorists as distinctively beautiful. However, Starikova also observes that 
mathematicians record emotions characteristic of the experience of beauty not only in 
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response to this specific visual representation of the Petersen graph but also in connection 
with the graph conceived independently of any diagrammatic representation. She explains 
this diversity in mathematicians’ aesthetic appreciation in the following way. First, she draws 
attention to the fact that this graph has more symmetries than any representation can make 
visible. Thus, she suggests that the beauty of the Petersen graph considered as an abstract 
object has its source in this rich family of symmetries that connects the simplicity and 
regularity of the graph with a wide variety of other properties that are of interest to 
mathematicians. Second, she argues that mathematicians single out a particular 
diagrammatic representation of the graph as especially beautiful because of the comparative 
ease with which it enables the mathematician to grasp the aesthetically relevant graph-
theoretical properties. On Starikova’s account, intellectual beauty is thus a simple 
coordination of significant properties and fruitful consequences, which can be inherited by 
perspicuous visualisations. The beauty we find in mathematics is thus not simply a matter of 
pleasing visualisations but also, importantly, ‘an aesthetics of the abstract’.  
Manya Raman-Sundström and Lars-Daniel Öhman’s paper ‘Mathematical Fit: A Case 
Study’ further contributes to answering question (1) by exploring the phenomenon of 
mathematical fit – a property that, they suggest, relates to the cognitive aspects of a proof as 
well as to its beauty. The authors develop their account of mathematical fit through a series of 
examples. Distinguishing three different, though possibly interdependent, types of fit, they 
analyse the features a mathematical proof needs to possess in order to be fitting in one or 
more ways. First, a proof has direct fit, or fits the theorem it proves, if it is stated in the same 
terms as the theorem (coherence) and uses a tool with the right level of technical power 
(specificity). Second, a proof has presentational fit if the underlying ideas are presented with the 
appropriate amount of detail (level of detail) and the proof makes clear its argumentative 
structure (transparency). Third, a proof has familial fit, that is, fits within a family of proofs, if 
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the idea of the proof generalises to a larger class of theorems (generality) and connects to proof 
ideas of other theorems (connectedness). With this analysis in hand, Raman-Sundström and 
Öhman illustrate why some proofs are more fitting than others, for example, why Euclid’s 
geometrical proof fits the Pythagorean Theorem better than a contemporary trigonometric 
proof. They conclude by suggesting that mathematical fit has a cognitive as well as an 
aesthetic dimension because of its close connection with mathematical explanation and 
mathematical beauty. Mathematical fit is related to mathematical explanations, since both 
are grounded in either the coherence or the connectedness of a proof; and mathematical fit is 
furthermore related to mathematical beauty, since both are characteristics of proofs with the 
right level of detail, transparency, connectedness, and even specificity and generality.  
Cain Todd addresses questions (2) and (3) in his paper ‘Fitting Feelings and Elegant 
Proofs: On the Psychology of Aesthetic Evaluation in Mathematics’. He does so by shedding 
light on the relation between aesthetic and epistemic criteria in mathematical reasoning. To 
this end, he examines the nature of the psychological experience that underpins 
mathematicians’ aesthetic judgments about mathematical proofs and theorems. His core 
claim is that bona fide aesthetic judgments in mathematics are expressions of ‘aesthetic-
epistemic’ feelings – feelings that serve a genuine epistemic function while also having 
aesthetic attributes. To substantiate this claim, Todd surveys the results of psychological 
research on epistemic feelings such as the feelings of knowing and understanding and of 
rightness and certainty. As he notes, the psychological research suggests that epistemic 
feelings play a genuine cognitive role in reliably indicating the accuracy of one’s own mental 
performance. For example, experiencing fluency, that is, the felt ease with which a cognitive 
task is performed, plays a crucial role in endorsing mathematical reasoning that is simple to 
follow and rejecting mathematical proofs that are difficult to understand. Moreover, Todd 
argues that the same epistemic feelings also have an aesthetic character if they manifest what 
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he calls ‘cognitive consonance’. That is, epistemic feelings have aesthetic attributes if they 
represent the relation between our cognitive processes and the properties of the stimuli at 
which those processes are directed in a way that appears fitting, or in harmony. According to 
Todd, mathematicians’ aesthetic judgments about theorems or proofs thus express epistemic-
aesthetic feelings of fittingness. 
Finally, Adam Rieger in his contribution ‘The Beautiful Art of Mathematics’ addresses 
questions (2) and (4). He argues for two distinct claims: first, the aesthetic vocabulary 
employed by mathematicians should be taken literally and, second, in certain respects, 
mathematical practice can be regarded as an art. Thus, supported by a range of examples, 
Rieger first argues that the typical object of aesthetic evaluation is the propositional content of 
a theorem or proof, thought of as a finite sequence of propositions. It follows from this, he 
suggests, that sensory properties are not necessary for aesthetic properties and that aesthetic 
evaluation in mathematics should not just be seen as a disguised form of epistemic evaluation, 
concerning, e.g., the fruitfulness of a proof method. Aesthetic judgments can be genuine, he 
claims, even if they are about the propositional content of a mathematical theorem or proof. 
Rieger then advances his second claim by highlighting salient traits that are shared by artistic 
and mathematical practice, notably their common attempts at telling us how things are in an 
aesthetically valuable way, their common concern with a selection of leading motifs and 
themes, as well as their organisation and composition. Rieger concludes on the basis of this 
analogy that some parts of mathematics can thus be regarded as an art. 
 
3. Further questions  
Each paper collected in this special issue offers a specific way of situating aesthetic 
considerations within mathematics. We also find each paper suggestive, explicitly or 
implicitly, of further goals and avenues for enquiry.  
	 8	
Thus, Starikova focusses on the notion of intellectual beauty in mathematics, which she 
likens to ‘a power, causing pleasure to mathematicians while they are intellectually engaged 
with the mathematical entity’. Her account suggests that, to understand what intellectual 
beauty is, we need to understand how the properties of abstract mathematical entities trigger 
an aesthetic response in the subject. Starikova’s paper prompts us to think further not only 
about the objective character of beautiful mathematical objects but also about the subject’s 
intellectual engagement with the mathematical entity that is required for the relevant 
pleasurable response to occur. Does such intellectual engagement consist in the process of 
understanding, for example, of what a particular graph entails and what consequences it has? 
Or is the subject’s intellectual engagement with the mathematical entity comparable to a 
form of perception, for instance, the perception of a graph’s visual representation, which is 
involved in experiencing the graph’s perceptual beauty? And how, more generally, does such 
intellectual engagement compare to the cognitive processes involved in the aesthetic 
appreciation of artworks? In raising these questions, Starikova’s discussion furthermore points 
to an interesting link of the aesthetics of mathematics with the visual aspects of mathematical 
thinking and the epistemic benefits thereof. We believe that this link may well be mobilised in 
future studies of the relationship between aesthetics and mathematics.2  
We furthermore find two interesting but very different approaches to the concept of fit, or 
fittingness, discussed in Raman-Sundström and Öhman’s paper and in Todd’s contribution. 
Raman-Sundström and Öhman focus on the properties that make mathematical proofs more 
or less fitting with the proven theorem. Todd, by contrast, is interested in the feeling of 
fittingness, where such fittingness is understood as a relation between our cognitive processes 
and the objects at which such processes are directed. One might wonder whether there is any 
																																																						
2 In this context, it will be worth paying specific attention to the different but related literature 
on the role of visualisation and diagrammatic reasoning in mathematics (see, e.g., Giaquinto 
2007 and De Toffoli and Giardino 2014). 
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significant relation between the feeling of fittingness Todd describes and the phenomenon of 
mathematical fit that concerns Raman-Sundström and Öhman. One might ask, in other 
words, whether there is any non-contingent connection between the objective relation of fit 
holding between different mathematical entities and the feeling of fittingness that expresses 
features of the subject’s psychology. Is it reasonable to expect that being aware of the 
phenomenon of mathematical fit will be correlated with the subjective feeling of fittingness? If 
it could be shown, for example, that our cognitive processes appear to be in harmony with the 
stimuli at which they are directed whenever they follow through a proof that fits with the 
proven theorem, might we be able to say more about why fitting proofs appear beautiful to 
us? These questions remain rather speculative. But answers to them might shed further light 
on the relation between the features of beautiful mathematical entities and the response of the 
subject that is involved in aesthetic appreciation. 
Finally, Adam Rieger begins to outline an account of the artistic dimension of 
mathematical practice, thus pointing to a type of investigation that is almost absent in the 
existing literature and deserves to be pursued further. His proposal calls for an exploration of 
the possible points of contact between the intellectual processes involved in artistic and 
mathematical construction, which might contribute to identifying similarities between the 
creative effort characteristic of each activity. One might ask, for example, how such 
intellectual processes relate to the cognitive processes of reasoning, understanding, knowing; 
and one might wonder in what way, if any, they represent creative or imaginative activities. 
We believe that a fuller elaboration on these questions would shed important light on the 
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